Description
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze whether or not the current doctrine for the inclusion of interagency coordination in a Joint Task Force or equivalent headquarters is adequate. The analysis engine used is two case studies that highlight the different aspects of interagency coordination between the Department of Defense (DoD) and other United States Government agencies. The first case study is an analysis of the United States participation in the international relief operation in the wake of the Asian tsunami in 2005. This operation demonstrates an example of an operation outside the United States in which the DoD was not the lead agency, and one that is largely regarded as a success. The second case study used is the federal relief operation in the wake of Hurricane Katrina in 2005. This operation demonstrates an example of a domestic operation in which the DoD was not the lead federal agency, and which is largely regarded as a failure. These case studies demonstrate that current interagency doctrine in inadequate to the task of coordinating large-scale national or international crisis, and that reform is needed in order to fully integrate United States Government efforts at home and overseas.
