Description
During World War I, American Airmen recognized airpower’s ability to assist the ground war by attacking ground forces. Immediately after the war, the Air Service supported the concept of ground attack in its doctrine and in its organization. Yet, this support quickly evaporated due to a fixation on strategic bombardment, a pacifistic national attitude, and anemic technological growth. Even after reminders of the importance of attack aviation during the Spanish Civil War, Poland, and France, American Airmen continued to neglect ground support. This neglect was an important factor for American difficulties before and during the Battle of the Kasserine Pass. By studying ground support’s path from World War I to its use in North Africa, American strategists can gain valuable insights into how leadership decisions can marginalize critical warfighting capabilities. In a time of tight budgets and limited resources, strategists must avoid being drawn into narrow thinking about capabilities. This paper also shows how factors outside of the government, such as budgets, politics, and technology, affect the development of both doctrine and weapons. Finally, this thesis underlines the physical and moral impact of air support. This impact is especially critical today, since the US Army transformation has reduced organic firepower, forcing it to rely more closely on the Air Force.
