Description
This monograph discusses the contemporary calls for a specialized unit to conduct Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). MOOTW is an interagency affair, in which the military serves to support civil government organs and non-governmental relief agencies. Successful MOOTW requires the military to possess martial proficiency, an awareness of the dynamics of the physical, social, political, and military dimensions of the operation, and leader skills that are different from those used in war. The Army’s “Just-in-Time” method of preparing units for MOOTW is effective, but not efficient. The “Just-in-Time” methodology induces risk to the Army’s ability to execute the United States’ two Major Theater of War (MTW) strategy. This monograph begins with an examination of the US Commission on National Security/21st Century (also known as the Hart-Rudman Commission) report. That report advocates development of forces optimized for MOOTW. The recommendations of the Hart-Rudman Commission are compared to the Army’s Title X responsibilities for the conduct of land warfare. These differing approaches to national security present the framework for evaluating the research question. Using historical examples from Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, the 1994 intervention in Haiti, this monograph presents a framework for evaluating the MOOTW environment. The physical, social, political, and military dimensions of MOOTW determine the operational and tactical level tasks that a MOOTW force must execute to accomplish the strategic purpose. The low-level tactical tasks required in MOOTW are essentially the same tasks that are required in war. However, the leader tasks are substantially different because of the increased importance of civil-military interaction inherent in MOOTW. This monograph concludes that the “Just-in-Time” approach to preparing MOOTW remains valid, but should be modified to improve its effectiveness and mitigate the adverse effects MOOTW have on MTW readiness. Leaders mus
