Description
Operations short of war, which are often dangerous and challenging, are a big concern for today’s Armed Forces. Also important is the study of operational art. The linkage between these two concepts, not yet fully developed, is critical. Defining victory, perhaps the most complex problem with the linkage, is the subject of this study. This analysis centers on the three essential questions of operational art in FM 100-5, Operations. These questions define victory for the operational commander. They are: (1) What military condition must be produced in the theater of war or theater of operations to achieve the strategic goal? (2) What sequence of actions is most likely to produce that condition? (3) How should the resources of the force be applied to accomplish that sequence of actions? The questions are probed using the strategic-operational, military-civilian and operational-tactical interfaces. These affect the definition of victory in operations short of war. Each interface is analyzed considering its affect on the questions mentioned above. The paper is conceptual. No specific campaign is studied, but a variety of examples from recent operations short of war such as Vietnam, the Iran hostage rescue mission, the Grenada operation, the raid In Libya and current operations in the Persian Gulf and NATO provide insights for the analysis. This monograph examines the complexity of operations short of war. This complexity leads to two deductions. First, actions in theaters of operations short of war qualify as operational art. Second, doctrine is inadequate in addressing the complexities these operations entail. The monograph also finds that the military-civilian interface is critical to success in these operations. Like it or not, operational commanders in operations short of war must understand and cope with policy, policy-makers and the media. Preparing commanders for this role requires emphasis. In the end, this study concludes that victory for an operational command
